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DOCTRINE AND THE INVESTMENT
DECISION DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutes of limitations restrict the time during which a suit
may be initiated on a cause of action.' After the time period
lapses, the cause of action becomes unenforceable.2 Thus, a
plaintiff who sits on his rights until the limitations period runs
is left without a remedy and the wrongdoer escapes liability. Al-
though this may seem unfair, "[b]arring stale claims promotes
justice and fairness and diminishes the risk of perjury and
fraud." 3
Statutes of limitations accomplish several purposes. They
encourage potential plaintiffs to bring suit promptly4 and, in
turn, protect potential defendants by barring claims that "have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
faded, and witnesses disappeared."5 They also give notice to po-
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
2. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
3. Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights
of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1017 (1980)
[hereinafter Special Project].
4. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879) (statutes of limitations stimulate activity
and punish delay); NLRB v. California School of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d 1099,
1101 (9th Cir. 1978) (statutes of limitations are designed to encourage parties to file suit
promptly); see also Special Project, supra note 3, at 1017 n.22.
5. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)
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tential defendants of the duration of exposure to liability and
limit the amount of litigation in an already overloaded court sys-
tem.' Therefore, although sometimes creating an inequitable sit-
uation, "the certainty of the fixed time periods clearly serves the
interest of everyone, for even plaintiffs benefit from a sure
knowledge of the time after which a suit would be futile."'7 As
the Supreme Court noted in Wood v. Carpenter:8
Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are
favored in law. They are found and approved in all systems of
enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving se-
curity and stability to human affairs. An important public pol-
icy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity [sic] and
they punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the
evidence of rights, they supply its place by presumption which
renders proof unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the time
proscribed, is itself a conclusive bar.'
To further these strong policies, statutes of limitations con-
sistently bar claims when a plaintiff unjustifiably commences his
action late. 10 Sometimes, however, circumstances beyond a
plaintiff's control prevent him from bringing suit within the ap-
plicable limitations period. The Supreme Court has stated that
"most courts and legislatures have recognized that there are fac-
tual circumstances which justify an exception to these strong
policies of repose .... These exceptions to the statute of limita-
tions are generally referred to as 'tolling' and... are an integral
(quoted in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); see also Gee
v. CBS Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, af'd, 612 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1979) (suit for alleged racial
discrimination occurring between 1923 and 1933 against singer Bessie Smith was time-
barred because most of the people involved were dead).
6. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956) ("purpose of [statutes
of limitations] is to keep stale litigation out of the courts").
7. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1186
(1950); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1980) ("Al-
though any statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period al-
lowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at
which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.").
8. 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
9. Id. at 139.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (courts should
strictly apply statutes of limitations to accomplish legislative intent); Campbell v.
Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982)
(courts must abide by statutes of limitations because they represent sound policy).
[Vol. 38
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DEFENSES TO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
part of a complete limitations policy."'" Tolling doctrines em-
body an overriding policy decision that a plaintiff should have
every reasonable opportunity to assert his claims."2 Thus, the
"policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently
outweighed... where the interests of justice require vindication
of the plaintiff's rights."" Tolling occurs when the plaintiff is
incompetent, incarcerated, or of unsound mind; when the plain-
tiff cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
pending the administration of a decedent's estate.14 Tolling also
may occur in other situations in which the defendant's ability to
bring a suit is impaired. For example, the limitations period is
tolled during the pendency of a class action or when a defendant
fraudulently conceals the plaintiff's cause of action.'
5
Tolling doctrines normally suspend, rather than extend, the
statute of limitations during the pendency of the event in ques-
tion. Therefore, once the barrier to the suit no longer exists, the
plaintiff will still be allowed whatever time remains under the
applicable limitations period. 6
This Note begins by discussing the relationship between
federal and state law with respect to tolling the statute of limita-
tions on federal claims which lack an express limitations period.
This Note then analyzes the primary defense for tolling the stat-
ute of limitations in securities fraud cases: the doctrine of fraud-
ulent concealment. It also analyzes the investment decision doc-
trine, a defense based upon the concept of a continuing sale
which postpones the date upon which the limitations period ac-
crues. Finally, this Note explores the relationship between these
two defenses. This Note will focus on securities fraud
cases-primarily claims under Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) rule 10b-517 and the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
11. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1980).
12. Special Project, supra note 3, at 1085.
13. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
14. Special Project, supra note 3, at 1084-85 n.342.
15. Note, The Tolling of Statutes of Limitations in Tennessee, 14 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 375, 377-79 (1984).
16. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 474 (1975) (concurrence and
dissent by JJ. Marshall and Brennan); see also Note, Limitation Tolling when Class
Action Statute Denied: Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 686, 689-90 (1985) (describing the difference between suspension, extension,
and revival of claims).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986)
1987]
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rupt Organizations Act (RICO). 8 Nevertheless, the use of these
limitations defenses is certainly not restricted to these, causes of
action.
II. FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION AND STATE LIMITATIONS
PERIODS
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's and
SEC rule 10b-5 prohibit fraudulent and deceptive behavior in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.20 Although
neither the statute nor the rule expressly grants a private cause
of action to an injured person, every court to consider the ques-
tion has implied a private right of action:2
The elements necessary to prove a Section 10(b) claim
have been so often applied by the lower federal courts that
they can be stated in black letter fashion. To make out a claim
under Section 10(b), which is based on the common law action
of deceit, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a misstatement or an
omission; (2) of material fact; (3) made with scienter; (4) on
which the plaintiff relied; and (5) that proximately caused his
injury.2
2
RICO is intended to protect businesses from enterprises op-
erated through illegal "predicate" acts.23 These predicate acts
range from commercial fraud to traditional crimes like murder
and arson, but the two broadest of these acts are wire fraud and
mail fraud.24 RICO does not prohibit the predicate acts them-
selves, as each is a violation of some other statute. Rather, a civil
RICO cause of action is based on a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity resulting from occurrence of at least two of the predicate
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
20. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
21. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 n.9
(1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied under section
10(b)."). Banker's Life affirmed the implied rights of civil recovery first recognized in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and widely accepted
by the lower courts for over twenty years.
22. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 459 U.S. 3375 (1983).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1981).
24. Arthur & White, Civil RICO After Sedima: The New Weapon Against Business
Fraud, 23 Hous. L. REV. 743, 746 (1986).
[Vol. 38
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acts.25 A successful RICO plaintiff can recover treble damages,
costs, and attorney's fees.26
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CoY the Supreme Court cau-
tioned that a "pattern" of racketeering activity will require more
than two isolated acts. The Court also noted, however, that
"RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Con-
gress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach,.
.but also of its express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.' "28 Therefore, in
Sedima the Court rejected two major barriers to civil RICO
claims. First, the Court held that the existence of a prior crimi-
nal conviction is not required to prove predicate acts.29 Second,
the Court suggested that the predicate acts need not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather by the lesser standard of
preponderance of the evidence.30 The Supreme Court's decision
in Sedima indicates that RICO clearly reaches normal business
fraud. Thus, it should end speculation and disagreement among
the circuits over whether RICO's treble damages were intended
to reach "garden variety" fraud. 1
There is presently no express statute of limitations applica-
ble to claims under rule 10b-5 or RICO.3 2 Because of the impor-
tant policies underlying limitations periods,33 however, federal
courts imply an applicable time period within which to allow an
action under these liability provisions. Generally, a federal court
will adopt the forum state's 4 limitations period that best effec-
tuates the policy underlying the cause of action.3 5 This limita-
25. Id. at 746.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
27. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
28. Id. at 3286.
29. Id. at 3284-86.
30. Id. at 3282-83.
31. Arthur & White, supra note 24, at 767.
32. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari, however, to determine
whether each state must select the one most appropriate limitations period for all civil
RICO claims. See Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 569 (1986).
33. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Movie Color Ltd. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961).
34. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976).
35. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) ("By adopting the statute gov-
erning an analogous cause of action under state law, federal law incorporates the State's
judgment on the proper balance between the policies of repose and the substantive poli-
cies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of action."); Hudak v. Economic Re-
1987] 793
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tions period is generally that which is applicable to the most
analogous cause of action in the forum state.3" For a rule 10b-5
action, therefore, federal courts most often choose between the
forum state's common-law fraud limitations period and that
state's blue sky limitations period.
7
In RICO actions, most courts determine the appropriate
limitations period by focusing on the particular predicate acts
alleged rather than on RICO itself.38 For example, in Burns v.
Ersek,39 which involved a civil RICO action alleging predicate
acts of mail and securities fraud, a Minnesota district court con-
cluded that securities fraud was the predicate act. It thus ap-
plied Minnesota's three-year statute of limitations for securities
fraud cases and specifically rejected the six-year statute applica-
ble to common-law fraud.4 °
This "particularist approach" creates certain problems in
application. If different types of predicate offenses are alleged,
search Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975).
36. See Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1980).
37. See Note, The Effect of a Defendant's Affirmative Concealment of his Securi-
ties Fraud on Section 10(b) Limitations Periods, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115, 1118
(1984).
38. Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1986)
("The federal RICO statute is not such a 'uniquely federal remedy' as [a civil rights
section 1983 action] and we hold that, as with most federal causes of action without
incorporated periods of limitations, the selection of the applicable state limitations pe-
riod in the individual case should be made on the basis of a characterization of the kind
of factual circumstances and legal theories presented .... In rejecting generic characteri-
zations, we note that Congress specifically considered and rejected the enactment of a
limitations period for civil RICO actions, thus declining to adopt a uniform limitations
period for all RICO claims."). Nevertheless, this case-by-case approach may be precluded
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 26 (1985), in which
the Court held that a state's general limitations period for personal injury actions gov-
erned all claims brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1982). In Malley-Duff & Assocs. v.
Crown Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit cited Wilson in holding
"that in borrowing state limitations periods for civil RICO claims courts must select, in
each state, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all civil RICO claims." Id.
at 349 (emphasis in original); see also Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d
1011, 1014-15 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986). The Third Circuit's opinion in Malley-Duff noted
that RICO's "effectiveness can be substantially thwarted by uncertainty, with the con-
commitant [sic] dissipation of legal resources." 792 F.2d at 349. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in this case to consider the question of how courts should choose limi-
tations periods for civil RICO claims. Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107
S. Ct. 569 (1986).
39. 591 F. Supp. 837 (D. Minn. 1984).
40. Id. at 845.
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there may exist different analogous state statutes of limitations,
thus forcing a separate analysis for each offense.41 Further, be-
cause of the wide variety of federal offenses and the disparity of
circumstances in each claim,42 courts must constantly reanalyze
the analogous state limitations period.4 3 Consequently, many
courts and commentators would prefer that Congress adopt a
uniform statute of limitations applicable to all RICO claims.
Although state law determines which limitations period ap-
plies to these federal causes of action, federal law determines
when the statutory period runs and when it is suspended.44 As a
general rule, a claim accrues when an injury occurs and is barred
after the limitations period lapses.45 In certain situations, how-
ever, federal law dictates that the state limitations period should
be tolled. If there is no comparable state tolling rule in these
cases, the federal and state policies directly conflict.
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency 46 the Supreme
Court held that although the federal policy controls, state law is
the federal courts' "primary guide" in determining tolling ques-
tions. 47 A federal court must adopt state law concerning "the
overtones and details of application of the state limitations pe-
41. Kronfield v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1476 (D.N.J. 1986); see
also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case ap-
proach in determining the statute of limitations in section 1983 civil rights actions for
this reason).
42. Kronfield, 638 F. Supp. at 1476.
43. See Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[T]he legislative purpose to create an effective remedy for an enforcement of federal
civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limitations, for scarce
resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral matters.") (quoting Wil-
son v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985); see also Note, Civil RICO: A Call for a Uniform
Statute of Limitations, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 205, 220-23 (1985).
44. Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605, 607 n.3 (3d Cir.
1980); Steinberg v. Shearson Haydon Stone, Inc. 598 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Del. 1984);
see 2 H. FINK, J. LUCAS, J. MOORE & C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07[2]
(2d ed. 1982).
45. Tolling suspends or temporarily stops the running of a limitations period. Ac-
crual, however, occurs when a plaintiff acquires a legal right to sue. Tolling differs from
accrual in that tolling doctrines presuppose the plaintiff's right to sue, but postpone the
actual running of the statutory period. As a practical matter, the effects of accrual and
tolling are often identical. In fraudulent concealment cases, "[t]he distinction between
the labels 'accrual' and 'tolling' is tenuous at best, and hardly justifies different results."
Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in a Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Stan-
dard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 846 nn.120 & 121 (1983).
46. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
47. Id. at 465.
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riod to the federal cause of action,' 48 and should apply uniform
federal tolling rules only when "application [of state law] would
be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of
action under consideration.""9 In Johnson the Court deemed
that there was no federal policy that would toll a section 1981
civil rights claim during the pendency of a Title VII employment
discrimination proceeding before the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission." Therefore, the Court held that state law
governed the plaintiff's action.
In 1980 the Supreme Court reiterated Johnson's approach
in Board of Regents v. Tomanio.51 The Court noted that state
law should apply in civil rights actions when federal law is "not
adapted to the object."'52 Since the pertinent state law did not
authorize tolling during the pendency of related but indepen-
dent state court litigation between the parties, the Court ruled
that a federal court could not invent a tolling doctrine to apply
under these circumstances."'
Several courts and commentators have questioned whether
Johnson and Tomanio require application of state tolling rules
to claims under federal statutes, including section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act.5 4 If state tolling rules applied, applica-
tion of doctrines such as fraudulent concealment would depend
upon whether the state in which the plaintiff filed suit recog-
nized these doctrines. 5 Thus, adopting this interpretation of
Johnson and Tomanio would encourage forum shopping.56 By
their own terms, however, Johnson and Tomanio do not apply
when established federal procedural doctrines are available.57
48. Id. at 464.
49. Id. at 465.
50. Id. at 467.
51. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
52. Id. at 484 n.5 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
53. Id. at 491-92. In Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661-62 (1983), the court
applied state tolling rules to another federal civil rights action, again noting that there
was no controlling federal rule. See generally Note, supra note 16. On the other hand,
when a state statute provides more protection for a plaintiff than a federal tolling rule,
the federal rule does not apply to restrict the plaintiff's rights. McConnell v. Frank How-
ard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 787 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 448 F.
Supp. 84 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
54. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 834-35.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 848.
[Vol. 38
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Therefore, the better view indicates that these cases did not in-
tend to abandon established federal tolling doctrines."
Another conflict between state and federal law arises in de-
termining when a case commences. Commencement describes
the activity that permanently tolls the statute of limitations."
Under the federal rules a civil action commences when a plain-
tiff files a complaint with the court." State rules vary, however.
In Oklahoma, for example, if a plaintiff does not serve process
on the defendant within sixty days after filing a complaint, com-
mencement is deemed to occur when the defendant is finally
served. 1 In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.2 the Supreme Court
held that this state rule, rather than the federal rule, defines
commencement of a diversity suit for the purposes of tolling the
state statute of limitations. 3 Although Walker dealt with a
state-created right,64 at least one commentator has concluded
that the case "casts doubt on the continued application of rule 3
to toll statutes of limitations in actions to enforce federally cre-
ated rights [since] [t]he Walker Court expressly reserved the
question of the role of rule 3 in actions based on federal law.1
6 5
III. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
The most common reason for tolling the statute of limita-
tions in federal securities cases is fraudulent concealment. Also
known as the equitable tolling doctrine, this defense recognizes
that when a defendant's wrongful conduct conceals a plaintiff's
cause of action, the defendant should not be allowed to assert
58. For example, in Kronfield v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454, 1474
(D.N.J. 1986), the federal tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied even though
the state statute of limitations provided for a fixed date of commencement of the limita-
tions period.
59. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 243 (5th ed. 1979). "[C]ommencement of an action in a
clearly inappropriate forum does not equitably toll the statute of limitations." Silverberg
v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs filed an
action in state court based on rule 10b-5).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971).
62. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
63. Id. at 752.
64. Id. at 753.
65. Comment, Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes of Limitations in Fed-
eral Courts: Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 66 CORNELL L. REV. 842, 859 (1981).
19871
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the statute of limitations to bar the plaintiff's claim.6 The doc-
trine, based on the general principle that a party should not be
allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoing, originally consisted
of two elements: Concealment by the defendant and due dili-
gence by the plaintiff.6 7 As stated by the Supreme Court in
Wood v. Carpenter,68 "Concealment by mere silence is not
enough. There must be some trick or contrivance intended to
exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry. There must be reasona-
ble diligence; and the means of knowledge are the same thing in
effect as knowledge itself." 9
The seminal Supreme Court case enunciating the fraudulent
concealment tolling doctrine is Bailey v. Glover,70 in which the
Court held:
When there has been no negligence or laches on the part
of a plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is
the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has been con-
cealed, or is of such a nature as to conceal itself, the statute
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by, or be-
comes known to, the party suing.
7 1
In Bailey the defendant allegedly transferred property to his rel-
atives and then declared bankruptcy to avoid a judgment
against himself.7 2 After the Federal Bankruptcy Act's statute of
limitations lapsed, the plaintiff sued to set aside these convey-
ances. Although the suit was late, it was permitted because the
Court recognized the injustice of barring a claim which the de-
fendant had concealed until the statutory period lapsed. 3 The
Court stated that "though there be no special circumstances or
66. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 375 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 875 (1974). See generally Note, supra note 37, at 1123-24 n.39-40.
67. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342
(1874). "Read together, Wood and Bailey establish first, that equitable tolling has two
elements, (successful) concealment by defendant and diligence by plaintiff, and second,
that a defendant who contrives to commit a wrong in such a manner as to conceal the
very existence of a cause of action, and who misleads plaintiff in the course of commit-
ting the wrong, may be found to have concealed the wrong." Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d
1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
68. 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
69. Id. at 143.
70. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
71. Id. at 349-50.
72. Id. at 342-43.
73. Id. at 343.
798 [Vol. 38
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efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal
it from the knowledge of the other party, '7 4 the statute would be
tolled until discovery when "the party injured by the fraud re-
mains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or
care on his part.
7 5
For the next forty years the Court applied this equitable
tolling doctrine to all congressionally set limitations periods,7 6
and in 1946 it extended the doctrine to actions based on federal
statutes which lacked specific limitations periods. The Court
read the fraudulent concealment doctrine into every limitations
period for federal claims in order to prevent the incongruous re-
sult of leaving a federal claim to "the bare terms of a State stat-
ute of limitations.
'7 8
Fifteen years later, in a leading case by the Second Circuit,
Judge Friendly concluded that the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine should apply not only to claims in equity, but also to
claims at law, because "there is no reason for borrowing a state
doctrine when there is an established federal one. ''1 9 Judge
Friendly refused to draw distinctions between actions "at law"
and "in equity" because of the potential for inconsistent re-
sults.80 Thus, the fraudulent concealment doctrine now applies
to all federally created causes of action, regardless of whether
the right borrows a state limitations period, or whether it is an
action "at law" rather than "in equity."8'
74. Id. at 348.
75. Id.
76. See generally Marcus, supra note 45, at 841.
77. Holmberg v. Albrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1946) ("This equitable doctrine is
read into every federal statute of limitations."). But see Walck v. American Stock Exch.,
687 F.2d 778, 792 (3d Cir. 1982). Walck asserts that this statement in Holmberg was
dictum, and "[t]he correct standard is stated in American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah, 404 U.S. 538, 557-58 (1974) (parallel citation omitted): 'whether tolling the limita-
tion in a given context is consonant with the legislative scheme.'" Id. Walck refused to
toll a claim brought under § 9(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78i(a)(1982) because § 9(e) of the Act, id. § 781(e), provided an absolute limitations pe-
riod. See infra subpart III.C.
78. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395-97.
79. Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 821 (1961).
80. Id. at 84.
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A. Elements
Although the Court originally described two elements of
fraudulent concealment-concealment by the defendant and due
diligence by the plaintiff-many courts today require the plain-
tiff to plead and prove an additional element to toll the statute
of limitations-the plaintiff's failure to discover the wrongful ac-
tions within the statutory period.82 This last element does not
appear to present many problems to either courts or parties.
However, the first two elements have generated a great deal of
discussion, confusion, and disagreement.
1. Concealment
There is considerable uncertainty today about whether both
concealment and due diligence are necessary to prove fraudulent
concealment. At least one commentator has concluded that
courts no longer consider concealment; due diligence is really the
only criteria examined.8 3 This commentator states that even
when courts claim to reject tolling because the defendant's only
concealment is "mere silence," the courts actually "pay substan-
tial attention to whether the plaintiff was diligent." s4 This indi-
cates that due diligence is the key ingredient.
As further evidence of the erosion of the concealment ele-
ment, a number of courts apply the equitable tolling doctrine
even when the alleged wrong is inherently difficult to discover
and the defendant has done nothing affirmative to conceal his
actions."" Although this treatment suggests that these courts do
82. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 271,
273 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
83. "When defendants volunteer an innocent and false explanation for their con-
duct, it is easy to find that independent acts of conealment [sic] have occurred .... In
other situations, however, the defendant merely denied wrongdoing without volunteering
an explanation. These cases have greatly troubled the courts. On one hand, it is difficult
to argue that a defendant conceals his wrongdoing by merely denying allegations....
Indeed, if such reasoning were carried to its logical extreme, a defendant would engage in
concealment by merely filing an answer in court denying the charges of the complaint.
...On the other hand, a knowingly false denial of specific charges of wrongdoing could
certainly be labeled fraudulent. It seems inequitable for a defendant to profit from his
misrepresentations when plaintiffs have reasonably relied upon them." Marcus, supra
note 45, at 861.
84. Id.
85. See Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975); see also infra notes 97-116 and
800 [Vol. 38
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not require concealment, no court has yet to admit to totally
disregarding the concealment prong of the doctrine. 6 Rather,
most of the cases address "self-concealed" wrongs; though the
defendant does not do anything affirmative to conceal his ac-
tions, by their very nature the wrongs are unknowable."'
Whether affirmative or accidental, however, not every act of
concealment will toll the statute of limitations. A critical ele-
ment or defense necessary to successfully maintain the particu-
lar cause of action must be concealed. The concealment need not
be merely the fact of injury or identity of the inflictor.8 For ex-
ample, the concealment may be of "facts that would prevent a
plaintiff from overcoming a seemingly ironclad defense."8 9
Several courts have recently wrestled with the distinction
between tolling the limitations period when there is a self-con-
cealed wrong and tolling despite the lack of any concealment by
the defendant. In Hobson v. Wilson 0 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia completed, as part of a sixty-two page
opinion, an extensive survey of the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine. The court stated that:
[B]efore a defendant's "exposure to liability is given a poten-
tially infinite duration, there [is] some minimum of culpabil-
ity-if not affirmative concealment, then at least the construc-
tion of a scheme which by its very nature is unknowable."
... Bearing in mind Wood's requirement of "some trick
or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion," we conclude
that defendants must engage in some misleading, deceptive or
otherwise contrived action or scheme, in the course of commit-
accompanying text.
86. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Fischback & Moore, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 271, 275-76
(E.D. Pa. 1986) ("[D]ue diligence is not sufficient to establish the defense of fraudulent
concealment. However, the essence of my holding here is that defendants wrongfully or
fraudulently concealed their conduct either through affirmative acts or by successfully
executing a conspiracy which by its very nature is self-concealing.").
87. See Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
88. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
89. Id. at 249-50 n.57 ("Lest our view be misconstrued, we would stress that the
statute of limitations is not tolled whenever a defendant has concealed facts material to
any legal issue of significance in a case. We do not provide for tolling simply because a
plaintiff's ability to mount a successful case has been impaired in some degree. Instead,
we provide for tolling only when concealment has so impaired the plaintiff's case that he
is not able to survive a threshold motion to dismiss for failure to tender a claim that
would advance beyond the pleading stage.") (emphasis in original).
90. 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1987]
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ting the wrong, that is designed to mask the existence of a
cause of action. The deception may be as simple as a single lie
or as complex as that which we confront here, so long as the
defendants conceal "not only their involvement, but the very
conduct itself."91
In contrast, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Fischback &
Moore, Inc.92 the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania con-
cluded that a self-concealing conspiracy can substitute for af-
firmative conduct by the defendant in order to satisfy the re-
quirement of wrongful concealment.9 3 The court stated, "If the
conspiracy conceals itself, it would be anomalous to require
plaintiff to allege affirmative acts by defendants to conceal the
conspiracy because such acts would be unnecessary and there-
fore never performed.1
9 4
The Bethlehem court, however, concluded that due dili-
gence alone would not be sufficient to establish the defense of
fraudulent concealment; something more is required. 5 Thus, the
court recognized that situations occur in which reasonably dili-
gent plaintiffs will fail to discover wrongs that are not affirma-
tively or self-concealed, and in these cases fraudulent conceal-
ment should not apply," although it is not clear that such cases
actually exist. It seems that a reasonably diligent plaintiff
should be able to discover a wrong that is neither affirmatively
nor self-concealed. Perhaps the explanation lies in the emphasis
given to the term "due diligence." A truly diligent plaintiff
would discover the wrong. Whether a reasonably diligent plain-
tiff would discover the wrong depends upon what conduct the
court considers "reasonable." Another approach to this aspect of
the fraudulent concealment doctrine is to assume that when
there is no affirmative or self-concealment, a reasonably diligent
plaintiff by definition will discover the wrong. If the wrong is
neither concealed nor discovered, the plaintiff cannot be reason-
ably diligent. This approach would not be a change in the
law-it would simply eliminate opportunities for courts to create
91. Id. at 34-35 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
92, 641 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
93. Id. at 275,
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ambiguous distinctions between cases.
At any rate, by allowing a plaintiff to assert the fraudulent
concealment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations when the
defendant has not committed an affirmative act to conceal his
wrong, courts emphasize the plaintiff's diligence and not the de-
fendant's concealment.
2. Diligence
In contrast to the tendency by certain courts to overlook the
requirement of a defendant's concealment, a number of deci-
sions have held that if the defendant affirmatively conceals his
actions, the plaintiff will be excused from his obligation of due
diligence. The Seventh Circuit formulated this view in Tomera
v. Galt.
9 7
In Tomera the plaintiff claimed that the defendants misrep-
resented certain features of a Mexican silver mining operation in
which the plaintiff had invested.98 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff filed
suit four months after the Illinois Blue Sky limitations period
had expired.9 The Seventh Circuit reversed this decision, how-
ever, holding that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient details
which, if proven at trial, would establish the defendant's fraudu-
lent concealment. 00
Tomera distinguished between the level of due diligence the
plaintiff must demonstrate when the defendant actively, rather
than passively, conceals his fraud.11 When a fraud goes undis-
covered, even though the defendant does nothing affirmative to
conceal it, the plaintiff must be duly diligent to toll the limita-
tions period. The issue here is whether the plaintiff could dis-
cover the fraud by exercising reasonable care.' 0° Conversely,
97. 511 F.2d 504 (7th cir. 1975); see also Note, The Effect of a Defendant's Affirma-
tive Concealment of his Securities Fraud on Section 10(b) Limitations Periods, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115, 1128-40 (1984); Comment, The Seventh Circuit's Reforma-
tion of the Equitable Tolling Doctrine, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 565.
98. 511 F.2d at 510.
99. Id. at 507-8.
100. Id. at 510-11.
101. Id. at 510.
102. Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1975) (reiterating its prior deci-
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when a "fraud goes undiscovered because the defendant has
taken positive steps after commission of the crime to keep it
concealed ... [the] fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations
period until actual discovery by the plaintiff." ' The relevant
inquiry in active concealment cases "looks to defendant's post-
fraud conduct-the presence or absence of an effective
coverup."'0 4 Thus, the defendant's affirmative concealment re-
lieves the plaintiff of his obligation of due diligence.10 5
In 1979 the Second Circuit adopted Tomera's distinction
between active and passive fraudulent concealment, 106 and a
California district court has also endorsed this approach.10 7 In
McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co.' 08 the Northern Dis-
trict Court of California noted that the Ninth Circuit has yet to
address the issue of whether a plaintiff's due diligence is re-
quired in all circumstances."0 9 After pointing out that other cir-
cuits are divided on this question," 0 the McConnell court en-
dorsed Tomera for two reasons. First, the rule "prevents a
defendant from defrauding a plaintiff and then intentionally
taking advantage of the plaintiff's naivet6 or laxity to cut off his
or her right of redress.""' Second, tolling the limitations period
until actual discovery when a defendant has actively concealed is
an easier rule to administer since it avoids the difficult inquiry
into when the plaintiff should have discovered the fraud." 2
Other courts have modified Tomera's distinction between
103. Tomera, 511 F.2d at 510 (citations omitted).
104. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 624 F. Supp. 959, 964
(N.D. I1. 1985).
105. Tomera, 511 F.2d at 510. In Board of Education v. Admiral Heating & Ventila-
tion, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 300 (N.D. Ill. 1982), an Illinois district court has extended Tomera
to a nonfraud case. One commentator concluded that Admiral Heating, which dealt with
an antitrust suit, "turns the concealment prong of the doctrine on its head because it
deprives the defendant of protection rather than providing added protection. Under the
approach of Admiral Heating, concealment dispenses with proof of due diligence alto-
gether, a far cry from serving as an independent element of the tolling showing." Marcus,
supra note 45, at 877 n.311.
106. Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979).
107. McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
108. 574 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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active and passive fraud.113 These courts have held that plain-
tiffs must be notified by "storm warnings" that something is
wrong before they are required to make diligent inquiries into
the circumstances of the fraudulent concealment:114 "Once the
storm warnings appear, the statute continues to be tolled as long
as the plaintiff makes diligent inquiries and will only begin to
run if the plaintiff ceases to exercise due diligence." 1 5 Neverthe-
less, in these cases the basic issue remains whether the plaintiff
was negligent in not discovering the fraud before expiration of
the limitations period.1
1 6
Not all courts have endorsed the view that the defendant's
affirmative concealment tolls the statute of limitations until ac-
tual discovery regardless of the plaintiff's diligence. For exam-
ple, in Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross'17 the
Tenth Circuit stated:
[W]e see no reason why an act of concealment by defendant
should excuse plaintiff from his obligation of diligence, which
he owes the court as well as his adversaries. Of course, if de-
fendant successfully conceals the fraud, the concealment would
fool the hypothetical diligent plaintiff and toll the statute. But
where, as here, the concealment is insufficient to fool a reason-
ably diligent plaintiff but nevertheless allegedly prevented dis-
covery by Ohio, the second doctrine of fraudulent concealment
urged by appellant would simply give it a second arrow to its
bow."'
Similarly, noting the strong policies furthered by statutes of
limitations, 1" 9 the Sixth Circuit in Campbell v. Upjohn 20 re-
113. See Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 696 (1st Cir. 1978); Hill v. Equitable
Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 599 F. Supp. 1062, 1075 (D. Del. 1984); Steinberg v. Shearson Haydon
Stone, Inc. 598 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Del. 1981).
114. Steinberg, 598 F. Supp. at 277.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690,
692 (8th Cir. 1981).
117. 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
118. Id. at 694 (emphasis in original); see also DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245
(10th Cir. 1986). When the plaintiff in DeVargas claimed that he could not repair his
defective complaint in a civil rights action because the defendants had concealed infor-
mation, the Tenth Circuit stated, "No conspiracy by the opposition could excuse plain-
tiff and his counsel from the discharge of their own, affirmative duty seasonably to em-
ploy the rules of civil procedure to correct and protect litigation commenced by them.
Conspiracy or no conspiracy, plaintiff's duties were absolutely fixed." Id. at 1257.
119. Commentators seem to agree that the policies behind statutes of limita-
1987]
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fused to formulate a separate rule for cases involving a defend-
ant's active concealment. The court explained that its holding
will not injure plaintiffs since a defendant's active concealment
will still be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's behavior under the circumstances.12' Further, in
Hohri v. United States122 the District of Columbia Circuit re-
jected Tomera's active/passive distinction despite its recognition
that completely discharging a plaintiff from his obligations of
reasonable diligence "serves as a punitive measure and perhaps
as a deterrent of further fraud."'23 The court noted that this de-
terrence may be sound policy, but it refused to impose it with-
out congressional direction.
124
Although it appears that the circuits have taken solidly dif-
ferent stances concerning the level of diligence necessary, this
split may be more apparent than real. As both Campbell and
Hohri noted, "actual discovery" cases usually concern situations
in which the concealment is so effective that there would be no
reason for even a diligent plaintiff to inquire into possible causes
of action. 12 1 For example, Tomera, Sperry v. Barggren,26 and
Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman127 all involved situations in
which reasonably diligent plaintiffs would not have been put on
tions-insuring that cases are decided upon reliable evidence and that they are adjudi-
cated without substantial delay-outweigh the detriment to a plaintiff who does not pay
attention to his own affairs. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 878.
120. 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1986).
121. Id. at 1128.
122. 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 248; see also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1169-70
(5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 616 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
124. 782 F.2d at 249. In reaching this conclusion the court emphasized that it was
dealing with an action against The United States. In future cases the circuit may draw a
distinction between suits against private parties and those against the United States.
Thus, a plaintiff could argue that diligence is not required in an active concealment case
against a private party.
125. See id. at 248 n.54; Campbell, 676 F.2d at 1128.
126. 523 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1975). In Tomera the officers and promoters withheld
information about investments, disbursements, corporate charters, and other business
affairs so that inquiry by investors into the legitimacy of the operation would have been
futile. 511 F.2d at 510. In Sperry the defendants would not disclose the price offered by
a third party for shares the defendant purchased from plaintiff until the plaintiff
brought suit. 523 F.2d at 711.
127. 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979). In Robertson the defendant accounting firm al-
tered work papers and destroyed documentary evidence of its participation in the fraud.
609 F.2d at 591-92.
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notice. In these cases a court may excuse the plaintiff from prov-
ing diligence since the defendant concealed all cause of reasona-
ble suspicion. It is redundant, however, for the court to create a
separate rule to denote this excuse; only one test is necessary. In
other words, when the plaintiffs clearly did not and could not
have discovered the fraud, there is simply no reason to submit
the issue of due diligence to the jury. 2 ' Thus, a court purporting
to apply the active/passive distinction in this situation is not re-
ally applying a separate rule. The only situation in which the
active/passive distinction makes a difference is when a reasona-
bly diligent person would have discovered the concealment, but
the particular plaintiff does not. In this situation, as the Tenth
Circuit has noted, the distinction gives the plaintiff a second ar-
row for its bow.
129
When courts do require proof of due diligence before tolling
a statute for fraudulent concealment, they must determine
whether the plaintiff's diligence should be measured objectively
or subjectively. Most courts apply an objective standard-that
of a hypothetical reasonable person. 30 Therefore, they refuse to
consider excuses like shock or naivete.' 3 ' One commentator
noted that such a harsh application of the rule will allow
"[w]rongdoers who prey on the gullible and ignorant [to] reap
unjust rewards if plaintiffs fail to discover the wrongdoing as a
result of their ignorance .... Nevertheless, relaxing the standard
of ordinary care would be ill-advised in the absence of evidence
that a defendant schemed to capitalize on a plaintiff's incapac-
128. Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975).
129. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.
1981).
130. See, e.g., Long v. Abbott Mtg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 117 (D. Conn. 1978); see
also Marcus, supra note 45, at 878-88.
131. For example, in Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mich. 1980),
aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982), a Michigan district court stated that the plaintiff's
"physical and mental difficulties may well have ... postponed the time when he should
have learned of the alleged scheme, but they cannot operate to require a lower level of
diligence than that expected of a reasonable person." 498 F. Supp. at 732. Similarly, even
when the plaintiffs were an elderly widow in a nursing home and her daughter-both
inexperienced in financial affairs-the Eighth Circuit refused to toll the statute of limita-
tions in a securities fraud case when there was no concealment. Koke v. Stifel, Nicolas &
Co., 620 F.2d 1340, 1343 (8th Cir. 1980). The court found that a reasonable person
should have been aware of any wrongdoing since the plaintiffs received accurate monthly
statements from the defendants. Id.
1987] 807
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ity.' 32 Allowing exceptions to the rule would simply "invite a
battery of creative excuses from plaintiffs like Mr. Campbell
who do not fall into any traditional category of incapacity.
133
In Hohri the District of Columbia Circuit applied this ob-
jective standard of due diligence, but added. specific guidelines
to help determine just how much diligence is reasonable. 4 A
court should consider whether any events placed the plaintiff on
inquiry notice of the fraud and whether this notice would be suf-
ficient to allow a duly diligent person to discover what was con-
cealed. 3 5 Nevertheless, the court noted that inquiry notice alone
would not cause the statute to begin running,13 stating that it
"is merely a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the
running of the statute.'
' 37
B. Pleading and Summary Judgment
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
plaintiffs to plead fraud with particularity.' Therefore, when a
plaintiff claims the equitable tolling doctrine should toll the lim-
itations period, he must specifically plead the facts underlying
the defendant's fraudulent concealment. Some federal courts
have used this rule to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints for failure to
allege the elements of fraudulent concealment with sufficient
particularity.'39
Most courts feel, however, that the summary judgment
stage is a more appropriate time to evaluate the plaintiff's due
diligence or the defendant's concealment since the court may
consider additional facts. 4" But even on a motion for summary
132. Marcus, supra note 45, at 879.
133. Id. at 880.




138. FED. R. Civ. P. 9.
139. See, e.g., Corson v. First Jersey Sec., 537 F. Supp. 1263, 1268-69 (D.N.J. 1982)
(court rejected the plaintiffs' complaint because their claim "that they did not know of
the fraud at the time of purchase of the securities fails to satisfy the requirement of
pleading fraudulent concealment with specificity"). But see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Fischback & Moore, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("Whether a party has
exercised due diligence is a factual issue which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss
unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no facts to support the claim.").
140. See Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Marcus, supra
[Vol. 38808
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judgment, the court's role is normally quite narrow; it should
grant summary judgment only if the undisputed facts estab-
lished that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.' When the plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment, the is-
sue of the plaintiff's due diligence will likely be disputed. Thus,
it seems that summary judgment would be inappropriate. The
defendant faces an "extremely difficult burden to show that
there exists no issue of material fact regarding notice."' 42 For
example, in Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman143 the Second
Circuit compared the question of due diligence to those of intent
or good faith and held that all of these issues were inappropriate
for summary judgment.1 4 4 The Ninth Circuit also endorses this
strict summary judgment standard.1 45 Trial courts in that circuit
send the due diligence issue to the jury unless the undisputed
facts lead to only one reasonable inference-that the plaintiff
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment prior to the
crucial date.
14
On the other hand, some courts adopt a broader view of
their role in deciding a motion for summary judgment when due
diligence is at issue. The Tenth Circuit considers diligence to be
in part an equitable question. 47 If the documents presented in
the motion for summary judgment clearly and convincingly per-
suade the trial judge that a reasonably diligent person would
have discovered the fraud before the limitations period lapsed,
summary judgment is appropriate.148 If the judge is not so
note 45, at 902-03.
141. McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 788 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
142. Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982).
143. 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979).
144. Id. at 591.
145. Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982); see McConnell v.
Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 788-89 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
146. See, e.g., Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1982)
(court granted summary judgment against plaintiff on the issue of due diligence because
plaintiff had already discussed filing a lawsuit, had contacted the SEC, and had indi-
cated a desire to retain counsel); see also Hill v. Equitable Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 599 F.
Supp. 1062, 1077 (D. Del. 1984) ("The question of reasonable diligence under the doc-
trine of equitable tolling raises factual issues that rarely may be decided by a court as a
matter of law.").
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clearly persuaded, diligence will be a jury question. 14 9
Regardless of the court's approach, on a motion for sum-
mary judgment defendants confront a heavy burden of proving
that no issue of material fact regarding the plaintiff's notice ex-
ists. However, once the case goes to trial on the merits, most
courts require the plaintiff to prove due diligence "since his
claim to exemption is against the current of the law and is
founded on exception."' 50 Only the District of Columbia Circuit
takes the opposite approach. 151 At least in cases involving self-
concealing wrongs, that circuit requires the defendant to prove
the plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence. 52 It places this
burden on the defendant because it characterizes due diligence
as an element of the defendant's affirmative defense of the stat-
ute of limitations.
5 3
C. Tolling Absolute Limitations Periods
This Note deals primarily with tolling doctrines as they ap-
ply to RICO and rule 10b-5 actions; however, the fraudulent
concealment doctrine also applies to many other causes of ac-
tion, including some for which a statute with an absolute limita-
tions period is applicable. Therefore, the issue arises whether
this federal equitable tolling doctrine should apply to statutes
with absolute limitations periods.
Every circuit to consider the question 54 has concluded that
fraudulent concealment cannot toll the three-year limitations
period provided in section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Se-
curities Act).' 5  This section actually establishes two federal lim-
149. Id.
150. Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
151. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richards v. Mileski, 662
F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
152. See cases cited supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Corwin v. Marwin, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1986); Walck v.
American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 792 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942
(1983), reh'g. denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1983); Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d
965 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1042-43 (10th Cir. 1980) (interpreting almost identical language in the Inter-
state Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1982), to constitute an absolute
bar).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
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itations periods applicable to civil actions under sections 11 and
12 of the Securities Act. First, under sections 11 and 12(2)
claims 15 16 must be brought within one year after a reasonably dil-
igent person would have discovered the false statement, and
claims under section 12(1) must be filed within one year after
"the violation"-the sale in violation of section 5.157 In addition,
however, section 13 creates an absolute limitations period: all ac-
tion under sections 11 and 12(1) must be brought within three
years after "the security was bona fide offered to the public,"
and claims under section 12(2) must be brought within three
years after the sale of the particular security in question. 158
Since Congress specifically recognized and addressed the diffi-
culty of discovering the defendant's violation, courts have cho-
sen not to allow tolling the statute indefinitely.159 Otherwise, the
three year absolute bar in the statute would serve no purpose. 60
Nevertheless, courts are split over whether the one-year lim-
itation on a section 12(1) claim may be tolled. Unlike the other
one-year provisions in section 13, this limitations period is not
triggered by discovery of a wrong. Rather, a claim simply must
be brought "within one year after the violation upon which it is
based." 6 In 1978 the First Circuit held that "[u]nder the ex-
plicit language of section 13, the limitations period [for an action
under section 12(1)] runs from the date of violation irrespective
of whether the plaintiff knew of the violation."'6 2 A California
district court has held, however, that section 13's one-year limi-
tation on a section 12(1) action can be equitably tolled by fraud-
ulent concealment.' The court rejected the First Circuit deci-
sion because it felt there was no sound reason for not applying
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1982) (providing for civil liabilities on account of false
registration statement, and those arising in connection with prospectuses and communi-
cations with mistatements or omissions of material facts, respectively).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
158. Id.
159. Walck v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 792 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 942, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1982) (refusing to toll the limitations period on §
9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, which employs the same limitations).
160. See Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc. 664 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1106 (1981).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
162. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978).
163. In re National Mtg. Equity Corp. Mtg. Pool Certificates Sec. Litig., 636 F.
Supp. 1138, 1166-67 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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the tolling doctrine."" It noted that unlike section 13's three-
year period, the one-year period does not, on its face, pose an
absolute bar to suit.
16 5
Although the circuits have generally agreed not to toll an
absolute limitations period provided by federal law, a different
situation arises when state law mandates the absolute period,
since rule 10b-5 cases must adopt a state statute of limitations.
Occasionally, the applicable state limitations period will call for
such an absolute bar. For example, the Wisconsin statute appli-
cable to rule 10b-5 cases imposes one- and three-year bars virtu-
ally identical to those in section 13 of the Securities Exchange
Act. '6 In Trecker v. Scag6 7 the Seventh Circuit held that fed-
eral tolling doctrines apply to both of these periods, extending
the "absolute" three-year limitations and supplying a "federal
gloss" to the discovery requirement in the one-year period.168
Similarly, a court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania re-
cently indicated that Pennsylvania's three-year absolute limita-
tions period would be tolled by a defendant's fraudulent
concealment. 69
IV. THE INVESTMENT DECISION DOCTRINE
As stated earlier, courts must use state law to determine the
limitations period applicable to a RICO or rule 10b-5 claim, but
normally apply federal law to determine when the cause of ac-
tion accrues and whether the limitations period should be
tolled.170 A rule 10b-5 cause of action accrues on the date that
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1324 (D.D.C.
1977) (tolling the one-year limitations period under § 12(1) because of an allegation that
the defendant sellers fraudulently represented that no registration was required).
166. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59(5) (West 1975).
167. 679 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982), on remand, 569 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Wis 1983),
afl'd, 747 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985). Despite this inti-
mation, however, the court held that the plaintiff was barred by the State's one-year
discovery limitations period since he should have discovered the defendant's wrong more
than a year before he filed suit. Id.
168. Id. at 706.
169. Adams v. Martyn, 639 F. Supp. 374, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Despite this intima-
tion, however, the court held that the plaintiff was barred by the State's one year discov-
ery limitations period since he should have discovered the defendant's wrong more than
a year before he filed suit. Id.
170. See supra pt. II.
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the relevant purchase or sale of securities occurred. 17 1 Generally,
a "purchase" or "sale" of a security occurs when a buyer com-
mits to buy or a seller commits to sell. In other words, it occurs
when there is a meeting of the minds between the parties. 172 The
transaction occurs on this date even if full performance does not
occur until a later date.
173
On the other hand, if a party agrees to buy or sell securities
but retains the power to terminate the transaction prior to full
performance, that party makes a separate investment decision
each time it possesses the power to terminate the transaction,
yet instead chooses to go forward.174 Each of these investment
decisions may constitute a purchase or sale of securities separate
and apart from the initial transaction.1
5
In Goodman v. Epstein 76 the Seventh Circuit formulated
the investment decision doctrine to distinguish "one-shot deals"
from those which contemplate a continuing relationship between
the parties. 177 Goodman involved an alleged rule 10b-5 violation
arising out of the sale of limited partnership interests in a land
development scheme. 78 After the plaintiffs lost a jury trial, they
appealed on the grounds that the trial judge had erred in certain
jury instructions, including those relating to the time the securi-
ties were purchased. 179 The jury instructions stated that the
plaintiffs purchased their securities when they executed the lim-
ited partnership agreements, even though they had to make sub-
sequent capital contributions upon demand of the general part-
ners.180 Because these agreements were not executed within the
applicable state limitations period, this instruction practically
eliminated any chance the plaintiffs had of obtaining a favorable
verdict on their claims.'
171. See Hill v. Equitable Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 599 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (D. Del. 1984)
(court noted that the parties agreed that rule 106-5 of action accrues at the date of the
relevant purchase or sale).
172. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890-91 (2d Cir. 1972).
173. Id.
174. Hill, 599 F. Supp. at 1072.
175. Id.
176. 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
177. 582 F.2d at 412.
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The Seventh Circuit remanded Goodman for a new trial be-
cause it observed that "the broad remedial purpose of the fed-
eral security laws"1 2 necessitated that the term "purchase" be
liberally construed. If the time of purchase was solely that point
at which the limited partnership agreement was executed, the
general partners' obligation to furnish information to the pur-
chasers would cease after that date."8 3 The purchasers would
thus no longer be entitled to material information concerning
their investments, even though their partnership agreements
contemplated a continuing relationship under which the pur-
chasers would have to make additional investment decisions.1
8 4
Accordingly, the court ruled that when investment decisions still
exist at the time of a call for capital contribution, each subse-
quent payment by a limited partner constitutes a separate
"purchase" of a security.'85 Therefore, "so long as an investment
decision remained to be made upon any possible state of facts,
the [defendant's] nondisclosure was in connection with the
purchase of a security. "186
The investment decision doctrine formulated in Goodman
coincides with the SEC's position in an analogous context-the
occurrence of a purchase or sale of assessable stock. Assessable
stock is stock for which a stockholder must pay more than his
original investment when corporate affairs so require.87 The
SEC allows an issuer to repurchase assessable stock if a stock-
holder fails to meet an assessment call, but it provides that a
"sale" of this stock occurs whenever the stockholder agrees to
pay any part of an assessment. 8 Goodman noted that with as-
sessable stock the stockholder's option "to return the stock to
the issuer in lieu of meeting the assessment requires an invest-
ment decision on his part, thereby bringing this situation within
the reach of the Act."'8 9 Similarly, Goodman held that each con-
tribution a limited partner makes in response to a call requires
an investment decision, and thus each contribution constitutes a
182. Id. at 410.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 414.
185. Id. at 413.
186. Id.
187. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 106 (5th ed. 1979).
188. SEC rule 136(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.136 (1986).
189. 582 F.2d at 414.
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separate "purchase" of a security.190
The investment decision doctrine prevents the statute of
limitations from beginning to run until the last act necessary to
purchase a security is taken.19 It applies, however, only to op-
tions that allow a party to avoid going forward with a purchase
or sale of securities (i.e., options that represent such a change in
the nature of an investment that in effect the option amounts to
a new investment). 92 These options include the ability to amend
or dissolve a limited partnership agreement. 93 They also include
maintenance contracts such as those for an investment in cattle.
For example, in Ingenito v. Bermec Corp.194 a New York district
court held that each payment on such a maintenance contract
represented an investment decision since "the herdowner
'bought' something each month which he did not own before
which, by virtue of the cancellation clause, he was not obligated
to buy.'
9 5
On the other hand, "'[m]ere retention' of securities during
a period of an alleged [securities] violation does not satisfy the
requirement that the violation be in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security."' 96 The investment decision doc-
trine does not apply to an option to sell shares since an option to
sell necessarily presumes that the plaintiff purchased the shares
and currently possesses the ownership rights to them.197 Al-
though the right to sell is an investment option, it exists sepa-
190. Id.
191. See id. at 413.
192. Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1983); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d
862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) (modifications affected by adop-
tion of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase of new securities);
Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F. Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (agreements
permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments).
193. Hill v. Equitable Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 599 F. Supp. 1062, 1073 (D. Del. 1984).
194. 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
195. Id. at 1184. But see Horsell Graphics Indus. v. Valuation Counselors, 639 F.
Supp. 1117, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that the investment decision doctrine did not
apply because the plaintiff was obligated to carry out the deal; plaintiff had already
passed up his investment option to cancel the contract); Stewart v. Germany, 631 F.
Supp. 236, 245 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (distinguishing Ingenito because, in Stewart, "each cash
call did not require a new 'investment decision' since Plaintiff was obligated to make the
payment and remained liable in the event of nonpayment despite forfeiture of her
interest").
196. Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 551 F. Supp. 1220, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
197. Hill, 599 F. Supp. at 1073 n.11.
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rately from the plaintiff's purchase and is not an option that al-
lows the plaintiff to avoid going forward with his purchase. 9 '
Similarly, the doctrine does not apply to an option to rescind a
transaction on the grounds of fraud since a plaintiff possesses
the option even if he paid for his shares in full at the time of
entering into a subscription agreement. If he had paid for the
shares in a lump-sum agreement, any subsequent right to re-
scind on the basis of fraud would not constitute an investment
decision under the investment decision doctrine. 9 Therefore,
"[a] different result is not compelled simply by the fact that
plaintiffs paid for their shares by means of fixed installment
payments... [since] the applicability of the investment decision
doctrine should not arbitrarily turn upon how purchase pay-
ments are structured under the transaction.
'20 0
In Hill v. Equitable Bank, National Association0 ' the Del-
aware district court held that under the investment decision
doctrine the "plaintiffs must establish not only that they pos-
sessed options to avoid their payments, but also that they would
have exercised these options if fraud had not occurred or if they
had discovered the fraud. ' 20 2 Therefore, any payments plaintiffs
make after obtaining sufficient knowledge of a claim to file suit
are not covered by the investment decision doctrine.20 3 The
plaintiffs' cause of action will be limited to those payments
made prior to obtaining this knowledge.20 4 Equitable Bank re-
jected the plaintiffs' excuses for continuing to pay defendants
after filing suit against other parties to the partnership, stating
that excuses were irrelevant. 205 The court stated instead that
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Freschi, 551 F. Supp. at 1229 n.9.
201. 599 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Del. 1984). This case arose out of an alleged scheme to
defraud plaintiffs in connection with the sale to plaintiffs of interests in two limited
partnerships. Plaintiffs first sued various parties to these transactions in Hill v. Der, 521
F, Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981). Plaintiffs then brought this securities fraud action against
Equitable Bank, the successor in interest to the Equitable Trust Company, which had
issued letters of credit to finance the plaintiffs' purchases. The Federal District Court for
Delaware twice denied motions to dismiss by Equitable. See Hill v. Equitable Trust Co.,
562 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Del. 1983); Hill v Equitable Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 599 F. Supp. 1062
(D. Del. 1984).
202. See Equitable Bank, 599 F. Supp. at 1074.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1075.
205. Id. at 1074-75 n.13.
816 [Vol. 38
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss4/6
DEFENSES TO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
"under the investment decision doctrine, it is only important
that, with notice of fraud, plaintiffs failed to exercise any [of
their] options."2 6
The court in Equitable Bank noted that when the invest-
ment decision doctrine does apply, the plaintiff's payments will
be considered integrated purchases of securities.20 7 As integrated
purchases, a single cause of action for all payments would accrue
on the date the last payment was made, rather than a separate
cause of action accruing on the date of each separate payment.08
Consequently, as long as the plaintiff's last payment was made
within the applicable statute of limitations, the plaintiff can re-
cover for all payments made.
Similarly, in Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp.209 a Georgia
district court stated that when there is a continuing sale "and
thus an integrated offering" under the investment decision doc-
trine, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff's last purchase of a security.210 Currie based its finding
of a continuing sale in part on the SEC's test for determining
whether apparently separate securities offerings should be con-
sidered a single integrated offering.2 11 The five factors the SEC
considers include the following: (1) Whether the offerings are
part of a single plan of financing; (2) whether the offerings are
made at or about the same time; (3) whether the offerings in-
volve issuance of the same class of securities; (4) whether the
same type of consideration is received; and (5) whether the of-
ferings are made for the same general purpose.2 2 In Currie the
final three factors heavily outweighed the time factor, and the
court thus concluded that there was a continuous sale. 1 3
According to Currie, the five factors the SEC considers
when determining whether an offering is integrated can also be
used to determine whether both an initial purchase of a limited
206. Id. at 1075 n.13.
207. Id. at 1075 n.15.
208. Id.
209. 595 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
210. Id. at 1376.
211. Id. at 1376-77. The SEC applies five factors to determine whether a securities
offering should be considered nonpublic for purposes of the registration exemption under
§ 4(2) of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633,
645 (9th Cir. 1980); see also infra text accompanying note 212.
212. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
213. 595 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
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partnership offering and a subsequent capital contribution
should be considered securities "purchases." Currie also relied,
however, on the more general rule that an investment decision
occurs when there is "such a significant change in the nature of
the investment or in the investment risks [that the change]
amount[s] to a new investment."214
With respect to motions to dismiss and motions for sum-
mary judgment, the same standards applicable to the federal eq-
uitable tolling doctrine also generally apply to the investment
decision doctrine. In other words, whether the investment deci-
sion doctrine applies is normally a jury question.215 For instance,
in Hill v. Der 16 the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' peri-
odic contributions to a limited partnership were simply fixed in-
stallment payments and thus did not require discretionary in-
vestment decisions.21 Nevertheless, the Delaware district court
ruled that on a motion to dismiss, it did not have the authority
to determine whether each of these payments constituted a sep-
arate purchase.21 ' Rather, the court stated, "It is the prerogative
of the trier of fact to resolve controverted issues raised by the
pleadings,' 21  and a court is limited to determining whether "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of
facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to
relief.
,220
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT DOCTRINE AND THE INVESTMENT DECISION
DOCTRINE
Technically, the investment decision doctrine does not toll
the limitations period; rather, it postpones the date upon which
the cause of action accrues.2 21 Since the effect of the doctrine is
214. Id. at 1377 (quoting Keys v. Wolfe, 709 F.2d 413, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1983)).
215. Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 413 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
939 (1979); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F. Supp. 1324, 1339-40 (D. Del. 1983); Hill v.
Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1386-87 (D. Del. 1981).
216. 521 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981).
217. Id. at 1386.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
221. Hill v. Equitable Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 599 F. Supp. 1062, 1075 (D. Del. 1984).
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virtually identical to tolling the limitations period, courts some-
times fail to note the distinction.222 Some plaintiffs, however,
have emphasized and attempted to capitalize on this distinction.
For example, in Equitable Bank the plaintiffs argued that be-
cause of this distinction, the investment decision doctrine and
the fraudulent concealment doctrine may be used together.2 23
The court in Equitable Bank held that under the investment
decision doctrine the limitations period accrued with respect to
defendant Equitable Bank when the plaintiffs filed an earlier
suit against other parties to the partnership. 24 Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs claimed that the fraudulent concealment doctrine
should also apply, and the limitations period should not begin to
run on their claim against Equitable until they learned of Equi-
table's particular role in the fraud. 25 The court agreed with the
distinction between the doctrines in principle, but it did not toll
the limitations period because it concluded the plaintiffs should
have already been aware of any fraud by Equitable. 26
In Equitable Bank the Delaware district court recognized
that there are circumstances in which both the investment deci-
sion doctrine and the fraudulent concealment doctrine apply:
First, to delay accrual of the limitations period, and then to toll
it. 227 Although this conclusion is technically correct, it is of lim-
ited importance. Under the investment decision doctrine a
plaintiff's cause of action accrues on the date of the last pay-
ment made before he obtains sufficient knowledge of the defend-
ant's fraud to bring suit. 2s The plaintiff must be duly diligent;
any payments made after he should have known of the cause of
222. See Stewart v. Germany, 631 F. Supp. 236, 246-47 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
223. Equitable Bank, 599 F. Supp. at 1075.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. Plaintiffs claimed they did not have firm evidence of Equitable's fraud at
the time they filed suit in Hill v. Der, "they merely suspected fraud." Id. at 1074 n.12.
The court rejected this argument, stating that "if these suspicions were ripe enough for
plaintiffs to file a lawsuit based upon the suspicions, then they were certainly ripe
enough for plaintiffs to exercise investment options allegedly available to them to avoid
their payment obligations on their shares." Id. The court also noted that "the invest-
ment decision doctrine can be a double edged sword." Id. at 1075 n.14. The cause of
action accrued at least at the time the plaintiffs filed suit against the related parties. It
may have accrued even earlier, however, if the plaintiffs, in the exercise of due diligence,
should have discovered fraud prior to the payments. Id.




Grayson: Defenses to the Statutue of Limitations in Federal Securities Cas
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
action are not protected. Once the cause of action accrues, the
fraudulent concealment doctrine may toll the limitations period;
however, this doctrine also operates to forestall running of the
limitations period only until the time that the plaintiff should
know of the defendant's wrongdoing. Since application of both
doctrines hinge on the plaintiff's knowledge of the cause of ac-
tion, there will rarely be more than a brief period of time during
which the fraudulent concealment doctrine will toll a limitations
period which has already been extended by the investment deci-
sion doctrine.
For example, suppose a plaintiff enters into a maintenance
contract on January 1, Year 1, and makes payments on that con-
tract on January 1, Year 5, and June 1, Year 5. On March 1,
Year 5, the plaintiff becomes aware of sufficient facts to alert
him to the defendant's wrongdoing. Assuming both doctrines ap-
ply to these facts, the investment decision doctrine would post-
pone accrual of the limitations period until January 1, Year 5,
and the fraudulent concealment doctrine would toll the limita-
tions period in Year 5 from January 1 to March 1. Thus, both
doctrines apply to the situation, but the fraudulent concealment
doctrine adds little to the plaintiff's attempt to extend the limi-
tations period. Of course, the real difficulty lies in determining
when the plaintiff should have discovered enough information to
be aware of the defendant's wrongdoing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitations further strong policies and are con-
sistently applied to bar stale claims. In securities fraud cases,
however, defendants often attempt to hide behind an expired
limitations period to escape wrongdoing. The result is particu-
larly inequitable when the defendant's own actions prevented
the plaintiff from discovering the wrong early enough to bring a
timely suit. To prevent a defendant from benefiting from his
own wrongdoing, courts created the fraudulent concealment de-
fense to statutes of limitations.
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment, also known as the
federal equitable tolling doctrine, was originally based on two
elements: Concealment by the defendant and due diligence by
the plaintiff. Today, there is considerable dispute over the ex-
tent to which each of these elements is required. The effect is
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that courts are often inclined to allow the defense if either ele-
ment is sufficiently fulfilled.
Another defense by which to postpone the statute of limita-
tions in securities fraud cases is the investment decision doc-
trine. This doctrine is related to the federal equitable tolling
doctrine because both are premised on the plaintiff's inability to
discover that he is being defrauded. Once the plaintiff obtains
sufficient knowledge to become aware of a potential cause of ac-
tion, neither of these doctrines will continue to extend the limi-
tations period. Although some plaintiffs have attempted to apply
both doctrines to bring a cause of action within the applicable
limitations period, this approach will not significantly extend
the limitations period since both doctrines take into considera-
tion the plaintiff's due diligence.22
Neil E. Grayson
229. At the time this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided Agency Hold-
ing Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987). The Court in Malley-Duff
held that the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under the Racketeer Influ-
ences and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
should not be the state statute of limitations under the most analogous state claim, but
should be, as examined in light of the statute's legislative history and structure, the same
as that under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982). Id. at 2765.
The Court stated in part as follows:
In sum, we conclude that there is a need for a uniform statute of limita-
tions for civil RICO, that the Clayton Act clearly provides a far closer analogy
than any available state statute, and that the federal policies that lie behind
RICO and the practicalities of RICO litigation make the selection of the 4-year
statute of limitations for Clayton Act actions the most appropriate limitations
period for RICO actions.
107 S. Ct. at 2767 (citation omitted). Compare supra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
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